A change of legislation in 2004 of the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (EMEA) allowed for more competition among suppliers of home care. The new law made it possible for the 32 regional healthcare purchasing agencies to contract suppliers selectively and to negotiate over prices and quality. Since, at least in some regions, one or two providers dominate the market, there are concerns about the effect of providers' market power on the pricing of home care services. This paper tries to assess whether these concerns are justified. Using complete data on contracted prices and quantities for 2004-2006, we find that, indeed, providers with a larger market share are able to contract at a higher price. We also find significant differences in contracted prices for some healthcare purchasing agencies, which points towards differences in their regional situations and/or policies. It is conceivable that both differences in market share and differences in price are driven by unobserved differences in quality. However, our analysis based on quality data reported in a consumer survey does not support this explanation. 
Introduction
Long-term care is a policy issue of great relevance in the Dutch political arena. Traditionally, most academic research in this field has focused on institutional care at nursing homes.
However, there has been a substantial increase in the use of long-term care delivered in the home care setting. An important paper addressing this topic is McKnight (2006) However, it is not clear that purchasing agencies have strong incentives to bargain over price and quality. The government sets an annual budget for contracting home care services for each purchasing agency, any unused budget must be returned to the government. Moreover, purchasing agencies may apply for additional funds if they run out of budget. All in all, purchasing agencies face only weak incentives for hard bargaining. Our results are conditional on this institutional feature of the market.
Although the change in legislation was meant to create incentives to negotiate home care services at lower prices, it only achieved a minor improvement compared to the previous situation. The outcome of negotiations is often at the regulatory maximum price 3 (in roughly 30% of contracts) or very close to it, while there was expected to be more room for price decreases. 4 In this paper we analyse two major factors that may be responsible for this outcome:
providers' market power and quality.
Market power is a serious concern in the home care market. At least in some regions, one or two large providers dominate the regional market and there is ongoing concentration among providers in other regions. Especially large providers may be able to exercise market power in
The Dutch term is Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ).
2 See e.g. Le Grand (1999) and Enthoven (2000) for a description of the British National Health Service and its internal market. 3 The maximum prices for all functions of care that purchasing agencies and suppliers can bargain over is set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, NZa) . As soon as the purchasing agency and the supplier have agreed on a tariff, this latter is submitted to the NZa that subsequently sets this ultimate tariff as the price for all clients of that particular supplier. 4 Such an expectation is based on the evidence of the so-called 'personal budget clients'. Instead of receiving 'in-kind care' from contracted providers, these clients get a budget to buy care themselves. The budgets are set at 75% of the amount based on regulated tariffs (CTG/ZAio, 2006, p.23) . This implies that there must be a substantial room for cost reductions below the regulated tariffs. Yet, prices of contracted providers, especially in personal and home care segments, are on average just some 5% lower than the regulated prices.
negotiation with the purchasing agencies responsible for contracting care, which produces a positive relationship between market share and the resulting price.
However, another possibility is that a high market share and a high price are both the result of high quality. It may be purchasing agencies use their bargaining power to induce higher quality rather than to lower the price (competition on quality). If purchasing agencies contract high quality providers, and if it is more costly to produce high quality, then this would also produce a positive correlation between market share and price. We test for this alternative explanation by including quality as a separate explanatory variable.
The paper is structured as follows. We will first explain the institutional setting and market structure in the provision of EMEA services (section 2). Next, we describe the data and the trends in the development of different market segments (section 3), after which we turn to the empirical analysis of the home-care segment. Section 4 presents the theoretical model that motivates our empirical strategy and empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Institutional background
The EMEA came into force in the Netherlands in 1968. This insurance scheme covers the whole population for serious medical risks. The EMEA consists of long-term care (e.g. nursing homes), and all those treatments and services that cannot be insured individually because such expenses would be too high to bear, notably mental illness requiring prolonged nursing and care, and congenital physical or mental handicap. The target group for services provided under the Act has expanded a great deal and has become much more diverse over the past few years; it presently mainly comprises elderly people, the disabled, and mentally ill patients with chronic problems. Each individual is automatically insured for EMEA services via the basic health insurance policy, which is mandatory. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) decides on the financial means needed for this insurance.
Organisation of EMEA
The EMEA insurance delivers intramural (inpatient) services and extramural (outpatient)
services. The main differences between intramural and extramural care are the following:
• Intramural services are delivered inside a medical institution, such as a nursing home, psychiatric clinics, etc. Intramural care involves more investment (e.g. in the infrastructure), it needs an extra licence for expanding the range of services, economies of scale are likely to arise, and only non-profit institutions deliver care.
• Extramural care relates to all services provided to patients living outside a medical institution. It does not involve a specific investment in expensive infrastructure, an expansion of a service (function of care) 5 can be arranged quicker and easier than intramural care because there is no need for an extra licence, there is a high concentration of firms in the market, and since January 2006 for-profit firms are allowed to enter the market.
6
The focus of this paper is on extramural care. In the last years this sector has undergone several changes, which aimed to introduce market competition elements into the system. Typically, the health insurance company with the highest market share in a region performs the role of purchasing agency in that region. 10 However, health insurers are not at risk for healthcare services under EMEA. Instead, the cost of these services is paid out of a special fund for EMEA services, which is filled by premiums paid by workers. 11 Suppliers of EMEA-care bargain with purchasing agencies over the amounts and the prices of care to be delivered.
Contracts are negotiated on a yearly basis. Negotiations take place with the purchasing agency of the region in which the supplier is officially registered. It is also possible for suppliers to provide services to clients residing outside the purchasing agency's own region. If 35% or more of all clients of a supplier come from a different region than the one where the supplier is officially registered, the purchasing offices of the concerned regions are jointly responsible for contracting such a provider, and they consult with each other about the financing of care. If 85% or more of all clients of a supplier come from another region, purchasing agencies can decide to delegate negotiations with the supplier to the purchasing agency of the region where the majority of its clients is situated (CTG-ZAio and CTZ, 2005b) .
Responsibilities of purchasing agencies
Purchasing agencies have several tasks and responsibilities that have been agreed upon in a series of covenants with the Ministry of Healthcare, the umbrella organization for all insurance companies 12 and the Healthcare Insurance Board 13 .
Their main task -as already described above -is to purchase healthcare services in the right amount for satisfying the regional demand for home care. They thus act as monopsonists in the region. By means of their purchasing and contracting policies, purchasing agencies effectively set the amount and quality of the care contracted. 14 They should be able to influence price, product development, and product differentiation. They are allowed to contract selectively and to set different requirements for different suppliers .
In general, purchasing agencies deliver so-called 'in-kind care', that is clients receive a care product instead of money to buy these services themselves. However, roughly 10% of recipients of EMEA services opted for having their own budget at disposal to purchase care themselves from the supplier they like most (see footnote 4). The number of such clients is increasing in recent years; people make their own choices and decide where to buy care themselves. This is partly due to the monetization of informal care (these clients do not have to use home care professionals, but can buy care from their neighbours, families and relatives). 15 However, this can also be interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction with the services offered by purchasing agencies.
In addition to the main task, purchasing agencies have to provide information to their clients about the content of a service provided by a supplier 16 and to minimize waiting lists for their clients for particular healthcare services. They also must keep accounts (per client) of spending the financial means of the EMEA insurance and monitor client satisfaction.
Funding of EMEA
Funding of EMEA services is arranged as follows: on the one hand purchasing agencies are reimbursed for the care services delivered by "their" providers (i.e. providers they have contracted), on the other hand they receive a fixed budget set by the Ministry of Health to cover their operation cost. Insurers incur excesses or shortfalls between actual operation costs and the 12 This is Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, ZN.
13 College voor zorgverzekeringen, CVZ.
14 Purchasing agencies must inquire the clients' experiences concerning the health services they received. Therefore they observe at least some dimensions of quality and thus can use this information when selecting among regional providers.
There are more arrangements safeguarding the level of quality of home care in the Netherlands. A specific law on quality makes the provider of EMEA services responsible for their own quality levels (ICM, 2005) . The Inspectorate for Healthcare (IGZ) checks whether each supplier complies with the minimum quality requirements set by law. 15 See Van den Berg and Schut (2003) . 14 budget. This structure creates an incentive for an insurance company to control the operation costs of its purchasing agency (NMa, 2004) . The incentive to reduce the price of contracted care
is therefore weakened to the extent that more intensive bargaining with suppliers over prices of services involves higher operation costs. Note also, that the agency would always strive for concluding contracts with all the major regional providers because failing to conclude a contract with such providers would cast a negative image on the agency and the insurer (NZa, 2007) , affecting the insurer's position in the market for health insurance. Therefore, healthcare providers know they will get a deal with the purchasing agency and have thus no incentives to reduce the price. Data
The dataset used in this paper contains data on contracted prices and quantities of extramural EMEA-services in the Netherlands. These services include more than one hundred different products. The dataset covers the period 2004-2006 17 and contains 38210 observations in total (about 12 000 per year). 18 The contracted prices and quantities result from negotiation between regional healthcare purchasing agencies and service providers. They cannot exceed maximum tariffs, set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) at the national level. These maximum tariffs are also included in our dataset.
There are 32 regional healthcare purchasing agencies and about 1600 service providers (1403 in our dataset) in the Netherlands. Each service provider negotiates its tariffs and quantities with only one regional healthcare purchasing agency. Table 1 shows the revenues based on regulatory tariffs and the revenues based on contracted prices. The percentages included in the table illustrate the difference between the regulated maximum tariffs and realised prices. Although there is a small decreasing trend in contracted prices relative to the regulated maximum prices and we observe a decline in the share of the contracts featuring maximum prices, there are still about 30% of such contracts. The average contracted price is just 6% below the maximum.
Our dataset covers 121 products. These products can be divided into two large segments, to which we refer as H and F in accordance with their official coding by the NZa 19 . The Hsegment includes house cleaning and personal care, supporting and activating supervision, and nursing. The F-segment covers products that relate to mental health. Especially in the Hsegment, contracted prices are close to the regulatory maximum price. The fact that prices in this segment lie closer to the regulated values than those in the F-segment allows for different interpretations. It is likely that the regulator has better insight in the cost level in the H-segment than in the F-segment. In fact, the regulator uses the results of benchmarking analyses to set maximum prices in the H-segment, while such analyses are not available for the F-segment. there were no restriction on the total budget of each healthcare purchasing agency; therefore, the product volumes that they could contract in those years were unrestricted. However, since 2004, the budget room available for contracting has been capped. This produced a change in incentives of health purchasing agencies, affecting both quantities and prices. 18 See Appendix 2 for the split by year. 19 The coding of products is in accordance with Circular CA-92. Another possibility is that purchasing agencies focus more on price in the F-market and more on quality in the H-market. Figure 3 .1 reveals more details on price differences between the two segments. In particular, we do observe censored data for larger sizes in the H-segment, but not in the F-segment. With just a few exceptions, providers normally specialise in delivering either H-or F-products, which makes it possible to analyse these groups separately. Relative price
Market share
We restrict our econometric analysis to the H-segment. The reason is that for the F-segment, defining regional markets is problematic. The service area of a provider does not always belong to one region, but may overlap with other regions. This is especially the case for mental care
and handicap care (PWC, 2005) , causing a bias in our data on regional market shares of the providers of these services (many of which are active in the F-segment). For home care, this problem is less severe. Below, we first describe the model motivating our empirical analysis, and then turn to estimation results.
Model
In a general bargaining model (Svejnar, 1986) , the potential gain from bargaining is divided between the players that play a bargaining game. The gain is expressed as the sum of deviations of the players' utilities ) , (
The bargaining outcome is the pair ) , ( j i U U maximising the expression:
in which γ, dependent on some factors Z, characterises the bargaining power of players.
This model has been applied in the healthcare context in order to analyze the outcome of negotiations between service providers and organisations contracting these services (such as insurers or healthcare purchasing agencies). See, e.g. Brooks et al. (1997) for applications to hospital-insurer bargaining. Here we apply a similar approach to analyse bargaining between EMEA service providers and regional healthcare purchasing agencies responsible for contracting these services in the Netherlands.
The disagreement payoff for the healthcare purchasing agency is determined by the maximum tariff R set by the regulator, and the disagreement payoff of the provider is determined by the minimum cost at which the provider either can still provide the service. The value function is expressed by the equation:
in which Q is the quantity provided, and C is the average unit cost and P is the price.
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A simple rearrangement gives:
If we assume that the parties bargain only on price, and not on quantities
21
, this expression is maximised at the value of P/R that satisfies to
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the average unit cost C does not depend on quantity. 22 Introducing notations p=P/R and c=C/R for the ratios between the original variables, we obtain
Here c represents the deviation of production cost from the regulated maximum tariffs and can be interpreted as the efficiency target set by the regulator; and γ is bargaining power of the service provider. Since the cost is unknown, the above equation does not identify γ and c separately. This means that we estimate the effect of market share on price rather than the effect of market share on the bargaining power of the provider.
We assume that the bargaining power of a service provider depends on structural characteristics, such as the provider market share in the regional market, s, and the degree of Here, the effect of structural characteristics on contracted prices p combines the effect of bargaining power and the effect of the regulatory estimate of R.
Estimation of the effect of market share
The empirical model that we estimate is specified in equation (7). Market share of each provider is computed as his regional market share based on contracted quantities and regulated prices.
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In addition to structural variables included in that equation, we also include year dummies and regional dummies, to control for changes of the effects over the years and regional differences. Since contracted prices are restricted by the regulated maximum tariffs, the revenues of providers cannot exceed the maximum revenues based on maximum tariffs. This means that the dependent variable (constructed as a ratio of contracted revenue and maximum revenue) is restricted by 1. OLS estimates would be biased in this case, therefore, we choose to use Tobit estimates, which are usually used for censored data. We also apply clustering by provider in our estimation. This procedure does not affect the coefficients but improves the robustness of their standard errors. Table 2 The effect of HHI appears to be small and insignificant. This result holds even if we reestimate the relationship excluding regional dummies (not shown here). Therefore, it is unlikely that the concentration itself is the reason for relatively high prices in some regions. The results of the Likelihood Ratio Test suggest that the inclusion of HHI does not increase the explanatory power of the model. 25 Omitting HHI from the model (not shown here) does not produce much change to the other coefficients and their t-statistics. Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 a) Regional dummies were also included in regressions. Here we do not report the respective coefficients in order to safe space. Chi2
(regional dummies) corresponds to the test for their joint significance.
We have performed a number of specification tests for our model (Hausman test and the link test 26 ). These tests accept our specification form. The proportion of censored data in the initial sample has appeared to be close to the proportion of censored data as predicted by the model.
Controlling for complexity
In order to assess whether the positive relationship between market share and price might be caused by other factors, we test for alternative models. One possible explanation for price differences across providers, is differences in the complexity of their client base. If larger providers serve more difficult clients, then we can also expect them to charge higher prices. To some extent, this is already taken care of by differentiated pricing of different products (more complex services have higher prices). But it may still be the case that there is some dispersion in the cost of delivery of each product, which is driven by the client type. More care demanding clients may end up with large providers because such clients are likely to need a broader range of services. As can be seen from Figure 4 .1, small providers often provide a limited number of products, while large providers typically have a broad range. Market share
Number of functions
We test for the plausibility of this explanation by including the variable number of functions in the regression, which serves as a proxy for complexity. When defining the functions, we apply the same classification of allocation as used by the regulator (see Appendix 1). A positive coefficient reflects the effect of complexity of care on the final price. If we still find a positive and significant effect of market share on prices after controlling for this effect, then this will support our conjecture regarding a higher market power of larger providers.
Indeed, the estimation results (see Table 2 , Regression 2) lend support to the argument that client complexity may be a factor driving the prices up, but it does not fully explain the existing price differentials between small and large providers. The effect of market share is still relatively large and significant. Table 3 illustrates the potential price differences as the result of the differences in market share, based on the results of our estimates in Table 2 . According to these estimates large providers who serve half of the regional market are able to charge about 4% more than small providers (where not restricted by the regulated maximum tariffs). Note that we also find significant differences in contracted prices for some healthcare purchasing agencies. To the extent that market share picks up market power, this must reflect other factors than relative bargaining strength. The negative coefficients for the year-dummies indicate that relative contracted prices (as compared to maximum tariffs) decreased.
Controlling for quality
Although we find a positive relationship between price and market share (and insignificant relationship with HHI), we cannot rule out that both differences in price and differences in market share are caused by differences in quality. For example, suppose healthcare purchasing agencies prefer to contract suppliers with high quality, and suppose also that it is costly to produce higher quality. Then this will result in a positive relationship between price and market share even if firms with high market share have no market power.
In order to further investigate this possibility we need to control for quality in our estimations. However, quality data are not available for the complete sample, but for a smaller sample of providers. Therefore, we can control for quality differences for this restricted sample of providers. This will allow us to check for sensitivity of the estimates obtained in Regression 2 (see Table 2 ) to the inclusion of quality. Besides, it may give us some insights into the relationship between quality and prices, if the coefficient for quality appears significant.
In 2005, an independent research bureau conducted a survey among 55,000 clients of 82
Dutch home care providers. The participants of the survey were asked to evaluate their care providers on different aspects of quality on a scale from 0 to 10. These evaluations were then aggregated to determine an integral quality score for each provider. Table 2 (Regressions 3 and 4) shows the results of regressions that control for quality differences. Since quality data are available only for one year, we first report the results including this year only (Regression 3), then the results (Regression 4) for the complete sample, based on the assumption that quality (or strictly speaking quality differences) does not change over time.
The findings indicate that the relationship between market share and price remains after controlling for quality. The coefficient for quality is positive, but insignificant. This precludes firm statements about the effect of quality on prices.
Conclusions
This paper evaluates the effect of market share on contracted prices of regional providers of home care in the Netherlands and explains the observed price differences across providers. We focus on two alternative explanations for these differences: market power and differences in quality. Both explanations are plausible: On the one hand, large providers may be able to exploit market power by raising prices above competitive levels; on the other hand, price differences across providers may be driven by quality, if healthcare purchasing agencies are willing to pay for better quality.
Our econometric analysis shows that, indeed, a larger market share is associated with a higher price. Since large firms typically deliver a broad range of functions, they maybe get a higher proportion of clients requiring complex (multi-functional) care, which in turn affects their prices. Therefore, we also incorporate a correction for client complexity. This correction leads to a slight reduction of the estimated effect of market share on price, but does not eliminate it. This supports the conjecture about higher market power of large home care
providers. This interpretation remains valid even if bigger firms would have higher costs (on which we do not have data). In a competitive market, only firms of optimal scale would remain active. If large, high-cost firms are able to pass on their costs in prices, then (ceteris paribus)
this is evidence of a lack of competition.
However, there may be a second explanation for this finding that is unrelated to market power. Suppose larger providers deliver higher quality. If purchasing agencies prefer to contract high quality providers, and if it is more costly to produce high quality, then this would also produce a positive correlation between market share and price. Unfortunately, quality data are not available for the whole sample. Therefore, we can only check our hypothesis for a smaller sample. The findings indicate that the relationship between market share and price remains after controlling for quality. This suggests that market power, rather than quality, explains the observed price differences in home care.
How could policy measures countervail this market power? As we explained in section 2, healthcare purchasing agencies must fulfil strict obligations with respect to the amount of care contracted for covering the region's demand. However, the purchasing agencies lack financial incentives to buy this care efficiently since they do not bear any financial risk on the price of care they purchase from providers, while they do carry full financial risk on the operational cost of contracting and negotiating. This may be a reason why they prefer to deal with a limited number of larger suppliers rather than with numerous small suppliers so that their transaction costs are kept down and their operation cost budget is not fully exploited. Also, there are no hard negotiations taking place between large care providers and purchasing agencies because not concluding a contract with large providers would cast a negative image on the agency and the insurer, affecting the insurer's position in the market for health insurance. Therefore, healthcare providers know they will get a deal with the purchasing agency and have thus no incentives to reduce the price.
From a policy viewpoint there are two possible solutions focusing on different time horizons. In the short run, one can think of stronger financial incentives for purchasing agencies, or imposing more efficient procedures, such as auctions, to assign EMEA services to individuals. 28 An auction mechanism stimulates competition between bidders and allows sellers and buyers to gain from the service exchange, provided that quality is clearly defined, contracted and enforced.
In the long run, an option may be that health insurers take over the responsibilities of the purchasing agencies in contracting with healthcare providers. If health insurers are made to bear all financial risks associated with carrying out this task, then they will have an incentive to bargain for a low price, possibly using an auction scheme as outlined above. Moreover, health insurers operate on a larger regional scale than purchasing agencies. As a result, health insurers will have a stronger bargaining position. However, since insurers may appear to be more focused on prices than on quality in their choice of providers, the issue of quality may arise. It is possible that the market mechanism will safeguard quality, e.g. if consumers "vote with their feet" by switching insurers in case of low quality. However it is unclear whether this mechanism creates a credible threat, since consumers of home care may not be profitable for health insurers. In principle, a risk equalization scheme could be used to address the latter problem, but whether this is feasible in practice remains an open question.
28 Since 2005 online auctions on postpartum services are taking place in the Netherlands via an internet website. This auction takes place between healthcare insurers and providers of care. The auction works as follows: The request for postpartum services is placed on internet and subsequently care providers have seven days at disposal to auction off.
